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Abstract 
 
Medical marijuana laws generate significant debates regarding drug policy. For one thing, if 
marijuana is a complement to hard drugs, then these laws would increase the usage not only 
of marijuana but also of hard drugs. In this paper I study empirically the relationship between 
marijuana use and cocaine and heroin use by analyzing data on drug arrests and treatment 
admissions. I find that medical marijuana laws increase these proxies for marijuana 
consumption by around 10–15%. However, there is no evidence that cocaine and heroin 
usage increases after the passage of medical marijuana laws. In fact, most of the estimates for 
cocaine and heroin are negative. From the arrest data, the estimates indicate a 0–15% 
decrease in possession arrests for cocaine and heroin combined. From the treatment data, the 
estimates show a 20% decrease in admissions for heroin treatment, although there is no 
significant effect for cocaine treatment. These results suggest that marijuana may be a 
substitute for heroin, but it does not have a strong relationship with cocaine.  
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 “I believe marijuana should be illegal in our country. It is the pathway to drug usage by our 
society, which is a great scourge—which is one of the great causes of crime in our cities.” 
Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts, speaking to students at the St. Anselm 
Institute of Politics in Manchester, New Hampshire, October 4, 2007 
 
“I believe that marijuana is a gateway drug.” John McCain, U.S. Senator, speaking at a 
meeting at Milton, New Hampshire, August 11, 2007 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea that marijuana is a complement to hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin, or 
even a gateway to them, is an important but controversial justification for marijuana 
prohibition that has had a strong influence on U.S. drug policy. The literature published on 
the relationship between marijuana and other substances in past decades is extensive, but a 
causal link has still not been established. Ethical and legal constraints prevent running 
controlled experiments on illegal drugs using human subjects, but even the evidence from 
animal experiments is not conclusive (Solinas, Panlilio, and Goldberg 2004; Ellgren, Spano, 
and Hurd 2006). A key difficulty in identifying any causal effect of marijuana use on hard 
drug use is finding a mechanism that generates arguably exogenous variation in marijuana 
consumption.  
Medical marijuana legalization (MML) represents a major change in U.S. policy 
towards marijuana in recent years. As of July 2014, 22 states and the District of Columbia 
had passed laws that allow individuals with designated symptoms to use marijuana for 
medical purposes. Although the direct effects of these laws are limited to legal patients, it is a 
popular belief that legalization of medical marijuana has increased illegal marijuana use 
among non-patients as well (Leger 2012; O'Connor 2011). Medical legalization may diminish 
the stigma associated with the drug, and people may perceive lower health and legal risks of 
smoking marijuana (Khatapoush and Hallfors 2004). Some evidence also suggests that 
medical marijuana may commonly leak from legal patients or dispensaries to illegal users 
(Thurstone, Lieberman, and Schmiege 2011; Salomonsen-Sautel et al. 2012). In fact, lobby 
groups behind medical marijuana laws, such as the National Organization for the Reform of 
Marijuana Laws (NORML), consider such legislation to be the first step towards full 
legalization. Two medical marijuana states, Colorado and Washington, successfully passed 
referenda to legalize marijuana for recreational use in November 2012. 
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The potential effects of MML on marijuana and hard drug use are not only policy-
relevant, they can also provide evidence on the relationship between marijuana and other 
substances. Some empirical evidence suggests that marijuana consumption has increased 
after medical marijuana legalization. For example, Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013) find 
that the price of high-quality marijuana decreases over time after legalization. Chu (2014) 
shows that medical marijuana laws are associated with a 10–20% increase in marijuana 
possession arrests and treatment admissions. A new working paper from Wen, Hockenberry, 
and Cummings (2014), who had access to the restricted version of the National Survey on 
Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) for the years 2004–2011, finds large effects of these laws:  
an increase of about 15–25% in marijuana use, on both the intensive and extensive margins, 
as well as an increase in marijuana dependence. The notion that marijuana is a complement to 
hard drugs, either through contemporary complementarity or intertemporal complementarity, 
leads many people to be concerned that the use of hard drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, 
will consequently increase. In fact, this is one of the major reasons why federal agencies such 
as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) firmly oppose medical marijuana laws and continue to list marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug (Drug Enforcement Administration 2011). Nevertheless, except for Wen, 
Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014), who do not find any significant effect of these laws on 
cocaine and heroin use, empirical evidence on the relationship between medical marijuana 
laws and hard drug use is almost nonexistent. 
To help build up the literature on this question, in this paper I employ two datasets to 
examine whether medical marijuana laws––and the associated increase in marijuana use––
affect cocaine and heroin usage. I study drug possession arrests from the Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR) for the years 1992–2011. As the arrest data do not distinguish between 
cocaine and heroin, and since arrests could also potentially be biased by changes in law 
enforcement, I further supplement the study by examining drug treatment admissions from 
the Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS) for the years 1992–2011. Although arrests and 
treatments do not measure drug use directly, and they reflect effects only on drug arrestees 
and treatment patients rather than the general population, these proxies have several 
advantages over survey data such as that from the NSDUH. First, these data are available for 
earlier years and cover more states with law changes. Second, these data provide many more 
observations of hard drug users. Based on the NSDUH, the past-year prevalence rates in the 
U.S. are around 1–2% for cocaine and 0.2% for heroin. These low prevalence rates suggest 
that the sample sizes at the state level in most representative datasets are probably not large 
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enough to provide precision. For instance, while the NSDUH is the largest survey of its kind 
in the U.S., its sample size in most states is only 900 people (600 for adults). In fact, the 
public-use state-level data from the NSDUH are available only as two-year moving averages, 
due to a concern over insufficient statistical power. In contrast, the UCR arrest data are 
available at the city level, and the TEDS data contain 1.5 to 2 million substance admissions 
each year, of which cocaine and heroin account for 40%. Finally, these data are objective 
measures and they do not suffer from the self-reporting bias that is common in survey data 
(Golub, Liberty, and Johnson 2005; Harrison and Hughes 1997). This is a particular concern 
in the current context because these medical marijuana laws are expected to change the public 
perception of marijuana. Indeed, Miller and Kuhns (2011) find that people report marijuana 
usage more honestly after the passage of medical marijuana laws. If these laws also reduced 
the stigma on other illicit drugs, there could be a spurious relationship between marijuana and 
cocaine or heroin due to people changing their reporting behaviors.  
I adopt a difference-in-difference research design and estimate reduced-form models 
for the effects of these laws, controlling for city/state and year fixed effects as well as city/ 
state-specific time trends. To preview the results, I find evidence supporting the popular 
notion that marijuana use does increase after the passage of medical marijuana laws. The 
estimates indicate a 10–15% increase in marijuana possession arrests and roughly a 10% 
increase in marijuana treatment admissions among adults. However, in contrast to what a 
contemporary or intertemporal complementarity would predict, I do not find strong evidence 
that the usage of cocaine and heroin has increased. In fact, almost all of the estimates show 
negative signs, suggesting that medical marijuana laws could have a negative effect on hard 
drug use. Specifically, the estimates of possession arrests for cocaine and heroin combined 
are uniformly negative, while the magnitudes fluctuate from close to zero to a 15% decrease, 
depending on the model specifications. In the treatment data, I find that medical marijuana 
laws are associated with a 15–20% decrease in heroin treatment admissions, but that they 
have no significant effect on cocaine treatment admissions.  
This research is important for several reasons. First, this paper employs a new policy 
tool—medical marijuana laws—for detecting the effects of marijuana on hard drug use. Most 
of the previous studies either use instrumental variables that are largely based on cross-
sectional variations, such as marijuana penalty and state excise taxes on beer, or they try to 
model individual heterogeneity econometrically. All of these approaches have some 
limitations in the context of drug consumption. Second, the causal effects of medical 
marijuana laws on marijuana and hard drug usage are at the core of the current policy debate. 
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In particular, as treatment patients are heavy users who are associated with negative health 
and social outcomes, understanding the causal effects among this subpopulation is 
particularly relevant to the design of policy. Finally, the results indicate some direct costs 
incurred by these medical marijuana laws, such as an increase in marijuana treatments, while 
they also suggest that some unintended positive externalities may exist. Future cost and 
benefit analysis may utilize these findings to obtain more precise estimates for the impacts of 
medical marijuana laws. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly describes medical marijuana laws, 
and Section 3 then reviews the relevant literature. I discuss the data and results from the UCR 
regarding arrests in Section 4 and those from the TEDS regarding treatment admissions in 
Section 5. I offer my conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. Medical Marijuana Laws 
An overview of state medical marijuana laws is provided in Appendix Table A1. 
Medical marijuana laws permit patients with legally designated diseases and syndromes to 
use marijuana as a treatment. The designated symptoms are often as follows: AIDS, anorexia, 
arthritis, cachexia, cancer, chronic pain, glaucoma, migraines, persistent muscle spasms, 
severe nausea, seizures, and sclerosis. Some laws, however, such as the one in California, 
also allow use for “any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.” Patients can legally 
possess marijuana up to a fixed amount. In many states, they can cultivate marijuana on their 
own. These laws also allow “caregivers” (most of whom are patients as well) to grow and 
provide marijuana to patients on a not-for-profit basis. In most states, it is mandatory to 
register and renew the registration every year to be a qualified medical marijuana patient or 
caregiver.1  
In principle, these medical marijuana laws only provide legal protection for patients 
and caregivers. They do not change the legal status of the non-medical use of marijuana. 
However, these loosely worded laws create a huge grey area and the legal boundary is blurred 
(Cohen 2010). This is probably done intentionally, as the lobbyists behind these laws 
consider such legislation a first step towards full legalization. A significant example of the 
legal grey area inherent in these laws is the legality of marijuana dispensaries. As most state 
medical marijuana laws did not directly authorize marijuana dispensaries prior to 2009, they 
1 California created a registration program in 2004 but registration is voluntary. Maine passed an amendment in 
November 2009 that created a registration program but it remained voluntary. Washington does not have a 
registration program.  
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existed only under the name of caregiver or patient cooperatives. Their prevalence depended 
largely on the attitude of the local government. For example, San Diego County has a very 
restrictive policy towards dispensaries and its law enforcement organizations actively 
cooperate with the DEA; the only county-licensed dispensary was even forced to close in 
2012 (Anderson 2012). On the contrary, some sources claim that there are more marijuana 
dispensaries than Starbucks coffee shops or CVS pharmacies in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco (Coté et al. 2008). Yet local attitudes and law enforcement can change dramatically 
from time to time. For instance, in June 2010, Los Angeles ordered the closure of over 70% 
of the 638 dispensaries then operating in the city.  
Some ambiguities also exist for low-level marijuana possession offenses. For example, 
California only requires patients to possess a "written or oral recommendation" from their 
physician, thus not requiring the recommendation to be documented. In general, there has 
been a softening in public attitudes toward marijuana in medical marijuana states, and federal 
agencies complain that cooperative relationships between federal and local law enforcement 
are deteriorating (GAO 2002). For instance, cities like Denver, San Francisco, Seattle, and 
Oakland passed initiatives either to legalize marijuana or to make marijuana possession 
offenses the lowest enforcement priority (Eddy 2010). On the other hand, except for 
California, the number of legal patients and marijuana dispensaries remained relatively small 
prior to 2009 (ProCon.org 2012), and the direct impacts on enforcement of low-level 
possession offenses appear to have been small, due to a small number of legal patients.2 To 
alleviate the tension between the federal and state governments, in 2009 the Obama 
administration stated that the federal agencies will no longer seek to arrest medical marijuana 
users and suppliers so long as they conform to state laws. Since then, the number of 
registered patients and dispensaries has increased significantly (Mikos 2011; Sekhon 2009; 
Caplan 2012). Although this statement appeared largely to resolve the legal dispute between 
state and federal governments, the Obama administration’s medical marijuana policy 
reversed somewhat in 2011, and there have been several cases of DEA raids on medical 
marijuana dispensaries that conform to state laws (Dickinson 2012).   
  
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Medical Marijuana Laws and Drug Use 
2 Although no official numbers are available for patients in states without registration, based on the large 
number of dispensaries, it is believed that California has many more patients than other medical marijuana states.  
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There is little doubt that medical marijuana legalization increases marijuana 
consumption among legal patients, because they will be able to increase their consumption 
safely and easily. On the other hand, as most states required patients to register and the 
number of registrants was small prior to 2009, one of the major policy debates is whether 
these laws also increase marijuana use among non-patients. Empirically, there is indeed a 
strong correlation between medical marijuana legislation, the perceived risk of marijuana, 
and marijuana use in survey data (Wall et al. 2011; Cerdá et al. 2012). However, the evidence 
supporting a causal relationship is somewhat mixed. For example, Harper, Strumpf, and 
Kaufman (2012) show that the positive correlation between these laws and marijuana use 
from Wall et al. (2011) is quite sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed effects in the public-
use NSDUH data. Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013) find that the price of high-quality 
marijuana decreases over time after medical marijuana legalization, but in another of their 
studies they do not find any significant effect on marijuana use among teenagers (Anderson, 
Hansen, and Rees 2012). In fact, almost all of the existing studies focus on juveniles and do 
not find any change in juvenile marijuana usage (Anderson, Hansen, and Rees 2012; Choo et 
al., 2014; Lynne-Landsman et al., 2013; O'Keefe and Earleywine, 2011). Although the 
marijuana prevalence rate is higher among young adults than among juveniles, very few 
studies focus on adults. Gorman and Huber (2007) use a time series framework and do not 
find any significant change in marijuana use among arrestees, but their sample was limited to 
a small portion of arrestees with available urine test results from only four cities in a short 
time span.  
One reason why many studies do not find increase in marijuana usage could be that 
they do not consider the intensive margin. A similar example is that zero-tolerance laws only 
decrease heavy drinking while having no effect on participation in drinking (Carpenter, 2004). 
Moreover, data quality seems to be an important issue in many of the existing studies. For 
example, Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012) apply the standard fixed-effect model to the 
public-use NSDUH data for the years from 2002/2003 to 2008/2009. However, state-level 
marijuana use rates from the public-use NSDUH are reported only as two-year moving 
averages (predicted values from a logistic model). The fixed-effect estimators may not be 
very reliable because the data are intended to reduce within-state variations, and only five 
states had law changes during their sample period. Both Wall et al. (2012) and Chu (2014) 
point out that the results from Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012) are actually quite 
sensitive. Another related problem, as Anderson Hansen, and Rees (2012) point out in their 
analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, is that the sample sizes are often 
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quite small in many representative datasets for smaller states. In fact, obtaining a larger 
sample size and therefore increasing precision is the main reason why the NSDUH reports 
state-level use rates only as two-year moving averages for public use (Wright 2004).  
Studies with better-quality data do find strong effects of medical marijuana laws on 
marijuana use. Based on the restricted version of the 2004–2011 NSDUH, with access to 
individual-level data, a new NBER working paper from Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings 
(2014) suggest strong effects of medical marijuana legalization on both the extensive and 
intensive margins. For adults aged 21 or above, they find an increase in the probability of 
marijuana use of 16% and an increase in marijuana use frequency of 12–17%. In particular, 
they find an even larger increase for heavy marijuana use, with a 15–27% increase in the 
probability of marijuana dependence. This is consistent with the results from Chu (2014), 
which show about a 10–20% increase in marijuana arrests and treatment admissions, which 
are arguably concentrated on heavy users. Moreover, in contrast to the existing literature that 
does not find any positive effect on teenagers, Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014) find 
an increase in marijuana use initiation of 5–6% for those 12-20 years old.  
As mentioned previously, almost no empirical evidence has been published on the 
relationship between medical marijuana laws and hard drug use. Drawing on the 1993–2009 
Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS), Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2012) show a negative 
effect of these laws, a decrease of around a 15% in cocaine use among teenagers, but they 
suggest that the magnitude is implausibly large. The estimates of Wen, Hockenberry, and 
Cummings (2014) from the NSDUH on cocaine or heroin use have large estimated standard 
errors and are never significant. In Appendix B, I also report estimates on marijuana and 
cocaine use based on the public-use NSDUH data, and the results are consistent with those 
from Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014). 
 
3.2. Relationship Between Marijuana and Hard Drugs 
An extensive literature on the relationship between marijuana use and hard drug use 
has yielded many hypotheses but little consensus. I do not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive survey of that literature here. Rather, I focus on some more recent studies that 
adopt different methodologies.  
The seminal work in economics on drug abuse is the rational addiction model from 
Becker and Murphy (1988) that provides a theoretical framwork for contemporal and 
intertemporal relationships between addictive substances. A straightforward empirical task 
for economists is to pin down these relationships, for example, whether marijuana is a 
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substitute for, or a complement to, hard drugs. Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) and Grossman 
and Chaloupka (1998) estimate demand functions for marijuana and cocaine, and they find 
that the price of cocaine is negatively correlated with marijuana use, while the status of 
marijuana depenalization is positively associated with cocaine use, suggesting that these are 
complements. On the other hand, recent studies based on laboratory control experiments 
show a more complex pattern, even though external validity could be a concern due to small 
sample sizes. The relationship between drugs seems to depend on different types of drugs in 
use. Jofre-Bonet and Petry (2008) find that marijuana is a complement to heroin for heroin 
addicts, but that it is a substitute for heroin for cocaine addicts. Petry (2001) finds that 
marijuana consumption is independent from cocaine for alcoholics, while Petry and Bickel 
(1998) find that marijuana is a substitute for heroin for opioid-dependent patients.   
Another focus of the literature is on the intertemporal complementarity between 
marijuana and hard drugs. In particular, a highly debated empirical question across many 
disciplines is the gateway hypothesis. Popularized by Kandel’s (1975) influential paper 
published in Science, the gateway hypothesis is based on one of the most robust empirical 
observations: most hard drug users have started with less dangerous drugs and there seems to 
be a “staircase” on which users of marijuana (or legal substances like alcohol) step up to 
cocaine and heroin. A gateway effect might be indeed causal, through physiological or 
psychological demand for stronger drug-induced pleasures and experiences. This is called 
consumption capital (of addictive drugs) by Becker and Murphy (1988). In addition, a 
gateway effect could come from social interactions like gaining access to hard drugs through 
participation in the illegal drug market (MacCoun 1998).3  
The infeasibility of running controlled experiments makes it extremely difficult to 
establish causality empirically, due to unobserved heterogeneity. DeSimone (1998) uses 
marijuana penalties, beer taxes, and the presence of alcoholic parents as instrumental 
variables and finds strong evidence for marijuana being a gateway drug for cocaine. 
Fergusson, Boden, and Horwood (2006a) find strong evidence using longitudinal data and 
controlling for individual fixed effects. (See also comments from Kandel, Yamaguchi, and 
Klein [2006], MacCoun [2006] and Fergusson, Boden, and Horwood [2006b].) Due to the 
difficulty of finding a valid instrument, some studies try to model unobserved heterogeneity 
econometrically. These studies generally find that unobserved heterogeneity is an important 
3 Note that if a gateway effect were working through social interactions, then legalizing of soft drugs and 
separating their markets from hard drugs would be better policy. This is actually the rationale behind the policy 
in the Netherlands that allows the legal sale of marijuana in “coffee shops.” 
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factor, but whether marijuana is a gateway drug remains unclear. For example, Pudney (2003) 
does not find a gateway effect after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, while some 
other studies find marijuana is a gateway drug for cocaine (Melberg, Jones, and Bretteville-
Jensen 2010; Bretteville-Jensen, Melberg, and Jones 2008; van Ours 2003; Deza 2014). 
Another strand of studies from epidemiology utilizes data on twins and finds a positive 
relationship between early marijuana use and the use of other illicit drugs (Lynskey et al. 
2003; Lynskey, Vink, and Boomsma 2006; Agrawal et al. 2004). However, as Bound and 
Solon (1999) observe in their critique, one potential problem in these twin studies is that the 
reasons why observably identical twins may make different choices are unlikely to be 
exogenous. Since even evidence from animal experiments is not conclusive (Solinas, Panlilio, 
and Goldberg 2004; Ellgren, Spano, and Hurd 2006), the original proposer of the gateway 
hypothesis, Denise B. Kandel, concludes that the existing evidence for the gateway effect is 
at best mixed, due to the lack of a clear neurological mechanism (Kandel 2003).   
 
4. Results from the UCR Arrest Data 
4.1. UCR data 
The data on drug possession arrests used in this paper are from the FBI's Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR) for the years 1992 through 2011. Although variation in drug arrests is 
affected by changes in law enforcement, arrest data remain the single most widely available 
indicator of illegal drug use within and across jurisdictions in the United States. The UCR 
arrest data provide monthly information on arrest counts by age, gender, and race in each 
crime category along with agency populations (estimated from the Census) for state and local 
police agencies. Note that each arrest count does not necessarily represent a single individual, 
since a person may be arrested multiple times. So, conceptually, the measure reflects changes 
in both the intensive and extensive margins. There are four categories of drug possession 
arrests, including one category for marijuana and one for powder cocaine, crack cocaine, 
heroin, and other opium derivatives together.4  As the crack epidemic ended around the early-
to-mid 1990s (DEA 1991; Fryer et al. 2010), and to be consistent with the starting point in 
the TEDS data, I use data on possession arrests from the years 1992 through 2011 (the newest 
data available).  
I use yearly aggregated arrest data provided by the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR); the FBI also reviews and checks the data using annual 
4 The other two subcategories are "truly addicting synthetic narcotics" and "other dangerous non-narcotic drugs" 
(most drugs in this category are methamphetamines).   
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arrest totals (Akiyama and Propheter 2005). Since participation in the UCR program is 
generally voluntary, many agencies do not report in every month or every year; even when an 
agency reports, it may not report data in all categories. One problem is that it is not possible 
to distinguish a true zero from missing data. Empirically, however, most missing data is from 
agencies with small populations and those that do not report for a whole year (Lynch and 
Jarvis 2008).  
In this paper, I focus on police agencies located in cities of more than 50,000 residents 
because the FBI regularly checks and communicates with these agencies to ensure data 
quality (Akiyama and Propheter 2005). Since population tends to increase over time, I 
include earlier observations from the above cities to make the panel more balanced if their 
populations are no less than 25,000. Similarly to Carpenter (2007), and as is common in the 
criminology literature, I focus on adult male arrests, and I use city-years only if a city reports 
arrests for marijuana or cocaine possession for at least six months during that year.5 (I do 
include city-year observations from cities that report only in December, since some agencies 
appear to report only annually.) The sample covers fifteen states that passed medical 
marijuana laws before 2012, including Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware Hawaii, 
Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Washington. The District of Columbia and Vermont are not in the sample due to sample 
construction: the District of Columbia has missing population data for years after 1995, and 
no city in Vermont in the UCR has a population greater than 50,000.  
Do marijuana and cocaine possession arrests represent underlying drug use? Studies 
from criminology indicate that drug arrests generally are valid measures for illicit drug use, 
especially for cocaine and heroin (Rosenfeld and Decker 1999; Moffatt, Wan, and 
Weatherburn 2012; Warner and Coomer 2003). Graphical evidence at the national level also 
suggests that they are valid measures. Figure 1 plots the yearly averages of the ratio of 
marijuana and cocaine possession arrests to all offense arrests along with marijuana or 
cocaine prices per pure gram. The marijuana prices are from the 2012 National Drug Control 
Strategy Data Supplement, and the cocaine prices are purchasing prices from the DEA's 
5 I consider only males in order to be consistent with the existing literature, and also because males are much 
more likely to be in the criminal justice system than females. For example, the possession arrest rates for adult 
males in my sample are four to seven times those for adult females. I focus on adults since cocaine and heroin 
use among juveniles is fairly low. In addition, the juvenile justice system is very different from the adult system 
in areas such as its procedures, incentives, and sanctions (Carpenter 2007; Levitt 1998; Terry-McElrath et al. 
2009). 
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System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE).6 In both graphs, the prices 
move in the opposite direction from the arrests, which is consistent with a supply curve 
moving along a downward sloping demand curve.   
Following Carpenter (2007) and Fryer et al. (2010), I create the ratios of marijuana 
and cocaine possession arrests to all offense arrests among adult males. Although the arrest 
rate is straightforward and commonly used, the measure of arrest ratios can partially account 
for unobserved changes in local law enforcement and measurement errors in arrest rates from 
estimated populations. In addition, as the resources of law enforcement are typically limited, 
arrest ratios can capture fluctuations in total arrests due to changes in resources allocated. 
Appendix Table C1 shows the means and standard deviations of the arrest ratios of marijuana 
and cocaine and heroin possession among adult males aged 18 and above. Note that 
marijuana arrest ratios are lower in medical marijuana states. Since marijuana prevalence 
rates are actually higher in medical marijuana states (based on the NSDUH, Appendix Table 
B1), and the number of legal patients was quite small prior to 2009, the allocation of 
resources towards marijuana law enforcement is probably lower in medical marijuana states. 
In the next section, I will propose an empirical model that can account for state heterogeneity 
at both the level and trend.  
 
4.2. Results 
My primary empirical strategy involves estimating city- and year-specific drug 
possession arrests as a function of whether the state had an effective medical marijuana law 
in place in that year. I begin by estimating the following model: 
 
(1) Yist = f (β Lawst + Year fixed effectst + City fixed effectsi + City time trendsit 
 + Control variablesist + εist), 
 
where the dependent variable Yist is marijuana or cocaine and heroin arrest ratios among adult 
males for city i in state s and year t. Lawst is a dummy variable indicating whether a state s 
had a medical marijuana law during year t, and it takes on fractional values for the years in 
which laws changed. 7  The main control variable is a dummy variable for marijuana 
6 Average cocaine prices are calculated by first obtaining the median price in each state and then averaging these 
median prices to the national level. Average cocaine prices that exclude some extreme values are similar to 
median prices. See Horowitz (2001) and Arkes et al. (2008) for discussions of the STRIDE data. 
7 There is normally a time lag between passing a referendum and it becoming an effective law (see Table A in 
the appendix). In some cases the referendum was delayed (e.g. Nevada) or even vetoed (e.g. Arizona in 1996 
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decriminalization in California (effective on January 1, 2011) and Massachusetts (effective 
on January 2, 2009). 8  Other control variables include city police officer rates per city 
residents (from the UCR), state unemployment rates, per capita average income (in 
logarithm), and per capita local and state expenditures on health, hospital, or police protection 
(in logarithm). The sample sizes are smaller when these control variables are included 
because data on government expenditures were not developed by the Census Bureau for 2001 
and 2003 due to sample redesign. In addition to city and year fixed effects, I include city-
specific linear or quadratic time trends to capture time-varying unobservables such as law 
enforcement. These city-specific time trends are particularly important in the current context 
because addictiveness suggests a strong serial correlation in consumption and thus drug use is 
likely to be trending. For instance, perhaps due to a more open attitude towards drug use, 
medical marijuana states tend to have higher drug use rates even prior to medical marijuana 
legalization. Because a proportion of these drug users will become addicted and continue to 
use, there will be a spurious effect of medical marijuana laws on drug consumption if existing 
trends are not controlled for. As many of these arrest ratios have values very close to zero, 
especially for cocaine and heroin arrests, I estimate Equation (1) as a fixed effect Poisson 
model, i.e., f (·) is an exponential function. I also check the robustness of functional form by 
estimating a log-linear model. Throughout this paper, the estimated standard errors are 
clustered at the state level and therefore are robust to serial correlation, within-state spatial 
correlation, and heteroskedasticity.  
Before discussing the empirical results, it should be noted that drug arrests are 
concentrated on heavy users and that they conceptually capture changes in both the extensive 
and intensive margins. Arrests in a particular city-year can be modeled as follows: 
 
(2) A = ∑  Nj=1 Fj × P(Xj), 
 
where N is the number of drug users, Fj is individual j’s transaction or use frequency; P(Xj) is 
the probability of being arrested per transaction or per use, a function of Xj, including city-
specific factors such as local law enforcement and individuals’ characteristics such as age and 
race. Conditional on arrest probability, Equation (2) shows that drug arrests are concentrated 
and D.C. in 1998) by the state government or Congress. Throughout this paper, as in Anderson, Hansen, and 
Rees (2013), the coding of Lawst is based on the date the law became effective and it takes on fractional values 
for the years in which laws changed. 
8 The estimates for decriminalization are around negative 1.5–2 for marijuana arrests and positive 0.15 for 
cocaine and heroin arrests.  
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on heavy users who have higher use or transaction frequencies.9 For simplicity, assume a 
homogenous probability of being arrested across j and ignore potential heterogeneity within a 
city.10 Letting F� be the average of Fj and taking logs, then in a particular city-year: 
 
(3) log(A) = log(N) + log(F�) + log(P). 
 
Differentiate both sides of (3), and the percentage change in arrests can be decomposed into 
the percentage change in drug use, either from the extensive or intensive margins, and the 
percentage change in arrest probability, which is a source of potential bias. 
Table 1 shows the estimates for the effect of medical marijuana laws on marijuana or 
cocaine and heroin arrests among adult males. In the upper panel, Columns (1) – (3), the 
estimates of marijuana arrests, are positive and significant regardless of time trend 
specifications. Specifically, on average, medical marijuana laws result in an 8.0–10.6% 
increase in the ratio of marijuana arrests to all arrests among adult males. In Column (4), the 
estimate is nearly identical with the inclusion of the full set of control variables. In Columns 
(5) and (6), the effects of medical marijuana laws on marijuana arrests are seen to be even 
greater using a log-linear model, indicating a 16.2-17.0% increase in marijuana arrests, but 
the larger estimates could be because a log function is more sensitive to small values. Since 
city-specific time trends and fixed effects already account for any smooth-trending variables, 
and data are missing in some of these control variables, in the rest of this section I focus on 
the specification that includes marijuana decriminalization as the only control variable.  
Note that each observation is a city-year while Lawst only varies at the state level. So 
the estimates are disproportionately identified by states that have large populations and 
therefore more cities.11 To ensure that the results are not driven solely by larger states like 
9 Because cocaine and heroin are highly addictive, the distinction between heavy users and light users may not 
be empirically relevant. On the other hand, due to the popularity of marijuana, such a distinction is important, as 
many marijuana users are only casual users. In fact, marijuana arrests are highly correlated with marijuana 
treatment, with correlation coefficients around 0.3–0.5, so many of the marijuana arrestees are possibly heavy 
users, as treatment patients. The greater heterogeneity among marijuana users than cocaine or heroin users may 
be one of the reasons why studies like Rosenfeld and Decker (1999) find that cocaine arrests are more consistent 
with drug use in survey data than marijuana arrests.     
10  It is straightforward to generalize the decomposition to incorporate heterogeneity in arrest probability, e.g., 
younger populations and minorities are more likely to be arrested. Econometrically, the estimates remain 
consistent or unbiased as long as arrest probability in each group does not change, but the estimates will reflect a 
weighted average of the legalization effects on each group, where the weight is positively correlated with each 
group’s arrest probability.    
11 In a linear model, if the explanatory variables vary only at the group level, then the least square estimates are 
numerically the same as the weighted least square estimates from a group-level regression using group averages, 
where the weights are given by the numbers of observation in each group. In Table 1, because the model 
specifications are not linear and with some city-level variables such as city-specific trends, the weighted 
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California, in the last two columns, (7) and (8), I average marijuana or cocaine arrest ratios to 
the state level, so each state receives equal weight regardless of the number of city-years. The 
estimates from state-level averages are qualitatively similar to those in Columns (1) – (6) 
regardless of the assumptions on functional form, and they suggest a 17.3–18.4% increase in 
marijuana arrests.  
In the lower panel, in Columns (1) and (2), the estimates suggest a decrease of 12.2–
15.3% in cocaine and heroin arrest ratios. When I include city-specific quadratic time trends 
in the model, in Columns (3) – (6), the estimates of cocaine and heroin arrests are essentially 
zero, and the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of control variables or functional form 
assumptions. The estimates from state-level regressions in Columns (7) and (8) also show 
negative signs but are insignificant. Clearly, there is no evidence that cocaine and heroin 
arrests increased after the passage of medical marijuana laws. In summary, my results suggest 
a positive effect on marijuana arrests of around 10–15% but no significant effect on cocaine 
and heroin arrests. These results are also consistent with the findings based on the NSDUH 
from Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014). (See also Appendix B for estimates based 
on the public-use NSDUH data.)   
One natural concern about the results from arrest data in Table 1 is that the estimates 
could be driven by changes in law enforcement. To address this concern, although indirectly, 
I examine the effects of medical marijuana laws separately for blacks and whites. If there is a 
considerable racial difference in the estimated effects, this would be a “smoking gun” 
indicating that the negative estimates for cocaine arrests are due to changes in law 
enforcement. It is well documented that African Americans are much more likely to be 
arrested for drug possession. Even though hard drug use rates, especially for crack cocaine, 
tend to be higher among African Americans, a nontrivial proportion of the racial difference in 
arrest risk can be attributed to law enforcement (Dannerbeck et al. 2006; Beckett, Nyrop, and 
Pfingst 2006; Donohue III and Steven D. Levitt 2001; Gross and Barnes 2002; Hernández-
Murillo and Knowles 2004; Parker and Maggard 2005). There are several potential causes for 
this. In addition to possible racial profiling, African Americans often engage in risky 
purchasing behaviors such as making transactions in open places, or they tend to live in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods that attract more police attention and so they have an increased 
estimates from a state-level regression will not be numerically identical to the estimates from city-level 
regressions. But the intuition should apply.   
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likelihood of arrest (Ramchand, Pacula, and Iguchi 2006; Beckett et al. 2005; Fellner 2009).12 
Therefore, drug arrests among African Americans are expected to be more sensitive to 
changes in police behaviors. A controversial instance that attracts much attention is New 
York City’s “stop and frisk” practice that has resulted in a huge increase in low-level drug 
possession arrests among minorities (Fellner, 2009). 
To account for the fact that non-drug offense rates and arrest risks are also higher 
among African Americans, I create all arrest ratios for cocaine separately among adult blacks 
and whites. 13  (The UCR does not separate genders among races.) Table 2 presents the 
estimated effects of medical marijuana laws on drug arrest ratios among blacks and whites. 
Since African Americans are more affected by the strength of law enforcement, if police 
behaviors were the major driving force for the negative estimates in Table 2, we would 
expect a strong racial difference in the response of drug possession arrests. However, for both 
marijuana arrests and cocaine and heroin arrests, the estimates do not exhibit significant 
racial differences and they are quantitatively similar to the results in Table 2 (but noisier). 
The estimates suggest about a 10–15% increase in marijuana arrests and roughly a 0–15% 
decrease in cocaine and heroin arrests among both adult blacks and whites. 
Even though the main components of medical marijuana laws are very similar from 
state to state, as briefly discussed in Section 2, they differ somewhat regarding the supply 
side. Since marijuana remains a Schedule I drug, none of these laws openly allowed 
dispensaries until New Mexico passed a law in 2007 that included a provision to license 
production and distribution at the state level. (The first state-licensed marijuana provider in 
New Mexico was not approved until March 2009.) The only exceptions are California and 
Colorado; their laws explicitly recognize the existence of dispensaries, even though they are 
silent as to their legality. Earlier medical marijuana laws (prior to 2009) circumvent federal 
regulations by allowing home cultivation. By contrast, laws and amendments passed since 
2009 do specify regulations on dispensaries, but they generally do not allow home cultivation. 
In Table 3, I examine whether the effects of medical marijuana legalization on drug use are 
different when laws explicitly allow for dispensaries. (See Appendix Table A1 for the list of 
12 For example, former New York Police Commissioner Lee Brown explained/defended the disproportionate 
racial impacts as follows: “In most large cities, the police focus their attention on where they see conspicuous 
drug use—street-corner drug sales—and where they get the most complaints. Conspicuous drug use is generally 
in your low-income neighborhoods that generally turn out to be your minority neighborhoods . . . . It’s easier for 
police to make an arrest when you have people selling drugs on the street corner than those who are in the 
suburbs or in office buildings. The end result is that more blacks are arrested than whites because of the relative 
ease in making those arrests.” (From Fellner [2009].) 
13 Other racial categories in the UCR are Asians and Native Alaskans or American Indians. The number of 
arrests for these races is very small. 
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these laws or amendments.) Due to the ambiguity of the legal status of dispensaries in 
California and Colorado, the dummy variable, Dispensary × Law, does not include these two 
states. Columns (1) – (4) show the results for marijuana arrests, and Columns (5) – (8) show 
the results for cocaine arrests. In Columns (1) and (2), the estimates for Dispensary × Lawst 
are consistent with the expectation that more complete legal protection would have a larger 
impact on marijuana use. However, because almost all of the laws allowing dispensaries have 
been passed during the Obama administration, which has a relatively open attitude towards 
medical marijuana, the estimates may simply reflect a regime effect instead of a true policy 
difference. For cocaine and heroin arrests, in Columns (5) – (6), the estimates for Dispensary 
× Lawst are not significant and very sensitive to time trend specifications. In Columns (3) and 
(7), I look separately at the two states that implicitly allowed dispensaries at an early point, 
California and Colorado, but they are not significantly different from other states except for 
one instance [CO× Lawst in Column (7)]. In Columns (4) and (8), I estimate Dispensary × 
Lawst, CA× Lawst, and CO× Lawst together, but the results are even noisier. Because most of 
the estimates for Dispensary × Lawst in Table 3 are quite noisy and not statistically different 
from other laws, they probably reflect only sampling errors rather than real differences in the 
policy effects. In fact, Anderson and Rees (2014) point out that the number of dispensaries is 
not closely related to the question of whether state medical marijuana laws directly authorize 
dispensaries. For example, dispensaries did not become common in Colorado until 2009, and 
the first New Jersey dispensary did not open until 2012. Therefore, at least currently, the real 
difference in these laws may be small. But it is possible that some of the details in legislation 
play a more important role in the future.   
Figures 2 and 3 present graphical evidence of the effects that medical marijuana laws 
have on marijuana and cocaine and heroin arrests. The upper graphs in each figure are based 
on the city-level samples. Since states with large populations like California are 
overrepresented in the city-level samples, in the lower graphs in each figure, I also create the 
graphs based on state-level averages. The graphs show the averages of marijuana or cocaine 
and heroin arrest ratios before and after medical marijuana laws became effective, where the 
X-axis measures the year relative to the state’s law change, with 0 denoting the first year of 
the law being effective, 1 denoting the following year, and so on. To create a synthetic 
control group, I first compute the average arrest ratios in non-medical marijuana states for 
each year, and then take a weighted average of these yearly averages, in which the weights 
come from the relative composition of each year in the treatment group (medical marijuana 
states). For example, for “Year 0” in the city-level sample in the upper graphs, around 57% of 
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observations in the treatment group are from California, which passed its law in 1996, so the 
weight put on the average of year 1996 in the control group is 0.57. In other words, in “Year 
0,” 57% of the observations in the control group are selected from year 1996. Similarly, for 
“Year 0” from the state-level averages in the lower graphs, only one out of 13 observations in 
the treatment group is from California, and the weight put on the average of year 1996 in the 
control group is 1/13.  In Figure 2, both the upper and lower graph show that marijuana 
arrests are relatively flat in medical marijuana states compared to other states prior to medical 
marijuana legalization (“Year -4” to “Year -1”). On the other hand, the immediate increases 
in marijuana arrests from “Year -1” to “Year 1” (the first full year with effective medical 
marijuana laws) are much greater in the treatment group than in the control group, especially 
from the state-level averages in the lower graph. By contrast, in Figure 3, there is no 
significant change in cocaine and heroin arrests in the upper graph. For the state-level 
averages in the lower graph, consistent with the negative estimates in Table 1, cocaine and 
heroin arrests in the treatment group actually appear to be decreasing after medical marijuana 
legalization.  
One important topic in the literature is the potential intertemporal relationship 
between marijuana and other drugs, such as the popular gateway hypothesis. For example, 
there might exist lagged positive effects on cocaine and heroin use if marijuana is a gateway 
drug and people need some time to progress from marijuana to cocaine or heroin. To further 
investigate the dynamic responses of cocaine and heroin arrests to the adoption of medical 
marijuana laws, in Table 4, I replace Lawst by a set of dummy variables, Years 1–2 through 
Years 9–10, which indicate each two-year interval after medical marijuana laws were enacted, 
and a dummy, Years 11+, for the eleventh year and above. In the first two columns, Columns 
(1) and (2), the estimates indicate that these laws have negative effects on cocaine and heroin 
arrests that are decreasing over time. To check whether cocaine and heroin arrests had been 
decreasing prior to medical marijuana legalization, I include an additional dummy, Years 
(neg. 1–2), which indicates the two-year interval before the laws were passed. In Column (3), 
the estimate for Years (neg. 1–2) is small and insignificant; in Column (4), the estimate for 
Years (neg. 1–2) is actually positive. So policy endogeneity is not a particular concern in the 
current context. In the last two columns, Column (5) and (6), I estimate the dynamics based 
on state-level averages, and they are quantitatively similar to the estimates based on the city-
level sample. So the results are not driven by one or two large states. Note that the decreasing 
estimates in Table 4 are consistent with the lower graph of state-level averages in Figure 3. 
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Clearly, from Table 4, there is no evidence supporting an intertemporal complementary effect 
or a gateway effect, i.e. that marijuana use increases future hard drug use.14  
Based on the UCR data, although marijuana arrests have increased since the passage 
of medical marijuana laws, there is no evidence that cocaine and heroin arrests have also 
increased. The results do not support the notion that marijuana is a complement to cocaine or 
heroin. One obvious limitation in these results is that they could be biased by unobserved 
changes in police actions. The direction of bias probably works against the above estimated 
effects, however. Many federal officials have expressed concerned that local jurisdictions 
will “opt out” of marijuana enforcement (Eddy 2010). For example, in a letter responding to a 
report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO 2002), the Department of Justice 
strongly complained that the GAO report failed to consider the deteriorating relations 
between federal and local law enforcement (see Appendix V in GAO [2002]). Actually, the 
GAO report did quote some local law enforcement officials who when interviewed said they 
would rather spend limited legal resources on pursuing hard drugs like crack cocaine instead 
of marijuana. At least on average, law enforcement towards marijuana is unlikely to increase 
while law enforcement towards cocaine or heroin is unlikely to decrease. Nevertheless, it is 
still a reasonable concern that changes in police behavior are driving the above results. For 
instance, police might shift enforcement from drug offenses towards other non-drug crimes in 
response to the passage of medical marijuana laws.  
Another disadvantage of the UCR arrest data is that they do not separate cocaine and 
heroin. Cocaine is a stimulant and its neurological effects are fundamentally different from 
those of depressants like heroin. Although marijuana is hard to classify, many of its 
neurological effects are more similar to depressants (Abood and Martin 1992; Domino 1971). 
For instance, both marijuana and heroin can relieve pain. Stimulants and depressants are 
often complements; for example, heroin can reduce the depression that ensues after the 
"high" from cocaine wears off, and it can also help with sleeping. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that cocaine dealers are often also heroin dealers. If there really is a 
substitution with marijuana, as some of the negative estimates indicate, it is more likely 
between heroin and marijuana rather than between cocaine and marijuana. In the next section, 
14 In a strict sense, the gateway hypothesis suggests that the initiation of soft drugs will progress to future use of 
hard drugs. It is clear that my reduced-form models can not directly identify a gateway effect due to the lack of 
individual data. On the other hand, there is some evidence Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014) that these 
medical marijuana laws increase marijuana initiation rates. (See also Appendix Table B2.) Because the gateway 
hypothesis would predict a positive effect of these laws on future hard drug use, the opposite findings in Table 4 
would be a strong rejection to the gateway hypothesis.   
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to further evaluate the impacts of medical marijuana laws separately on cocaine and heroin, I 
employ data on substance abuse treatment referrals from rehabilitation facilities. 
  
5. Results from the TEDS data 
5.1. TEDS data 
The treatment admission data are from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration’s (SAMHSA) Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS) for the years 
1992 through 2011. Similar to the UCR, each admission does not uniquely identify an 
individual. For each admission, the data report at most three substance abuse problems of the 
patient, demographics such as gender and age, and the sources of referral. About 40% of 
treatment admissions are referred by the criminal justice system, 30% are referred by 
individuals or the patients themselves, and 20% are referred by health care providers and 
substance abuse care providers.15  
The TEDS collects admission data from all substance-abuse treatment facilities that 
receive public funding in each state. Some states collect data on all patients in publicly 
funded facilities, while others only collect data on publicly funded patients. The total number 
of admissions greatly fluctuates in some state-years, which might be due to changes in 
available funding or reporting practices. For example, the total number of treatments reported 
dropped to about half of previous levels in Washington after 1999. To account for the 
fluctuations in total admissions and capacity constraints of rehabilitation facilities, as 
commonly reported by the SAMHSA, I create ratios of cocaine or heroin treatments to all 
substance treatments for each state as measures. Because each admission lists at most three 
drugs, I define marijuana-/cocaine-/heroin-related treatment admissions as such if they are 
identified as the primary, secondary, or tertiary abuse problem; and marijuana-/cocaine-
/heroin-related primary treatment admissions as such only if they are recorded as the primary 
abuse substance. Note that marijuana-related treatment ratios are more consistent with how 
drug use rates are defined in survey data. As juvenile hard drug treatments are rare, and to be 
consistent with the UCR arrests, I only use adult (age 18 and above) treatment admissions. 
On the other hand, since criminal justice referrals are excluded and therefore the potential 
gender differences in arrest risks are not a particular concern, I use both male and female 
admissions, to keep more observations. (The results from considering only male admissions 
in this section are nearly identical.) The sample includes all medical marijuana states that 
15 The remaining 10% are referred by community or religious organizations and self-help groups such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous. 
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passed laws before 2012.16 The summary statistics for marijuana, cocaine, and heroin-related 
treatment and primary treatment ratios are in Appendix Table C2.  
 
5.2. Results 
To evaluate the effects of medical marijuana laws on drug treatment admissions, I 
estimate the following model: 
 
(4) Yst = f (β Lawst + Year fixed effectst + State fixed effectss + State time trendsst  
+ Control variablesst + εst), 
 
where Yst is the marijuana, cocaine, or heroin-related treatment or primary treatment ratio in 
state s and year t. As in the previous analysis, I estimate Equation (4) as a Poisson model or a 
log-linear model and I cluster the standard errors at the state level. I focus on the 
specifications with specific time trends and with marijuana decriminalization as a single 
control variable to keep a larger sample size.17   
 Table 5 shows the estimated effects on drug treatment ratios. The results on related 
treatments are in the left panel, and the results on primary treatments are in the right panel. In 
the first two columns from each panel, Columns (1) – (2) and (5) – (6), the estimates are from 
a Poisson model without additional controls. Consistent with marijuana arrests in the UCR, 
the estimated effects of medical marijuana laws are positive, and they suggest a 5.9% 
increase in marijuana-related treatments and an 8.6–9.5% increase in marijuana-primary 
treatments after the passage of medical marijuana laws. However, the estimates on marijuana-
primary treatments are noisier. Although marijuana is the most popular illicit drug and it 
accounts for one third of total treatments, it is not highly addictive and only accounts for 
about 10% of primary treatments. (See Appendix Table C2.) For cocaine treatments, all of 
the estimates are small and never significant, and therefore they suggest no effects of medical 
marijuana laws on cocaine treatments. In contrast, the estimates on heroin treatments are 
negative and quite large in absolute terms. Specifically, based on the first two columns in 
each panel, after the passage of medical marijuana laws, on average, heroin-related 
treatments decreased by 10.2–20.2%, and the heroin-primary treatments decreased by 13.1–
23.9%. As a robustness check, in the third column, I include the same set of state-level 
16 Arizona does not report data for the years 1992–1997. Alaska does not report data for the years 2004–2007. 
The District of Columbia does not report data for the years 1992, 1993, 2004–2007, and 2009–2010.  
17 In non-criminal justice referrals, most of the estimates of decriminalization are small and insignificant. 
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controls as in the UCR analysis. (The sample sizes are smaller due to missing data in these 
controls.)  These results are similar to those from the first two columns. In the last columns in 
each panel, Columns (4) and (8), I estimate Equation (4) as a log-linear model, and the results 
remain quantitatively similar but with much larger estimated standard errors especially in 
marijuana treatments. So the Poisson model does appear to fit the data better.  
 As in the previous analysis from the UCR arrests, the results in Table 5 do not support 
a complementarity between marijuana and cocaine or heroin. In fact, there appears to be a 
decline in heroin usage while there is no change in cocaine usage. To show this graphically, 
Figure 4, constructed in the same way as Figures 2 and 3, illustrates the changes in 
marijuana- (upper), cocaine- (middle), and heroin- (lower) related treatment ratios before and 
after the passage of medical marijuana laws. The graph for marijuana is quite noisy, but it 
exhibits a more rapid increase in treatment ratios in medical marijuana states. For cocaine, 
both in states with and without medical marijuana laws, cocaine treatment ratios show a 
similar pattern of smoothly decreasing over time, suggesting no effect of medical marijuana 
legalization on cocaine treatments. For heroin, the heroin treatment ratios in medical 
marijuana states were roughly flat but have shown a decrease after the passage of laws. By 
contrast, the heroin treatment ratios in states without laws are slowly increasing.   
About 40% of the treatment patients are criminal justice referrals. They are broadly 
defined as patients referred by anyone affiliated with a federal, state or county judicial system, 
and they may be referred through either civil commitment or criminal commitment. The 
sources include diversionary programs, paroles, prisons, court for criminal offenses, court for 
DWI/DUI, etc. Although these criminal justice referred treatments are not directly linked to 
drug arrests, it is a legitimate concern that the results from the treatment data might be biased 
by potential changes in law enforcement, as in the arrest data. In Table 6, I exclude these 
criminal justice referrals from the sample and I estimate the effects of medical marijuana laws 
on treatments due to non-criminal justice referrals. (The sample sizes are smaller because 
Alaska does not report the source of referrals in 1998–2003 and Connecticut does not report 
this in 2003.) As seen from Table 6, nearly all of the estimates are quantitatively similar to 
the estimates from Table 5. The estimates in Table 6 suggest an increase in marijuana-related 
treatments of 7.4–8.6%. The estimates from marijuana-primary treatments are quite noisy, 
which is probably the result of a smaller proportion of marijuana primary treatments among 
non-criminal justice referrals; nearly 70% of marijuana primary treatments are from criminal 
justice referrals. For cocaine and heroin treatments, as in Table 5, I do not find any significant 
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effect on cocaine treatments but I find a significant decrease in heroin treatments of roughly 
10–20%.  
 For completeness, in Table 7, I estimate separately the effects of laws that allow for 
dispensaries, as in Table 3 in the UCR analysis. I focus on mutually exclusive primary 
treatments among all referrals. Generally speaking, most of the results are quite noisy as in 
Table 3, and there does not appear to be a consistent pattern. In Columns (1) and (2), most of 
the estimates for Dispensary × Lawst have very large estimated standard errors and they are 
often sensitive to time trend specifications. (Dispensary × Lawst does not include California 
and Colorado.) In Columns (3) and (4), the estimates for CA× Lawst and CO× Lawst suggest 
negative effects on marijuana treatments. 18  The estimates for CA× Lawst are somewhat 
sensitive to time trend specifications especially for heroin treatments. The estimates for CO× 
Lawst on cocaine and heroin treatments are uniformly negative and not statistically different 
from other states except for one instance. Note, however, that as the treatment data are at the 
state level, the estimates for individual states are probably subject to finite sample bias and 
may not be very reliable. In Columns (3) and (4), conditional on California and Colorado, the 
estimated effects of laws on marijuana treatments are near one third larger than those in Table 
5 and imply about a 12% increase in marijuana-primary treatments. The somewhat sensitive 
estimates on marijuana treatments in Tables 5 and 6 are mainly due to the large negative 
estimates for Colorado.19 In fact, the estimates on marijuana treatments are always significant 
and suggest around a 10% increase if conditional on Colorado (not reported). On the other 
hand, in Columns (3) and (4), the estimated effects on cocaine- and heroin-primary 
treatments are not sensitive to the inclusion of these two states. In Columns (5) and (6), I 
estimate Dispensary × Lawst, CA× Lawst, and CO× Lawst together, and the results are similar 
to Columns (1) – (4).  
 One particular concern is that the negative relationship between marijuana and heroin 
suggested above could be spurious and come mechanically from the measure of treatment 
ratio. Even for mutually exclusive primary treatments, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin 
18 Since California and Colorado were the only two states (implicitly) allowing marijuana dispensaries prior to 
2009, these negative estimates may come from some unobserved characteristics in these two states. For instance, 
as the main sources of referrals are criminal justice and individual referrals, the negative estimates for California 
and Colorado may reflect a lower level of law enforcement or lower perceived risks towards marijuana. In fact, 
the estimates for California among non-criminal justice referrals are not always statistically different from other 
states.  
19 The negative estimates for CO× Lawst for all three substances are partially due to a large increase in alcohol 
treatments after 2001. Colorado has one of the highest alcohol treatment ratios among all states, and the number 
of alcohol treatments in Colorado increased by more than 60% from 2001 to 2002, which coincides with the 
year of medical marijuana legalization. Based on the 2013 Brewers Almanac developed by the Beer Institute, 
alcohol consumption in Colorado in the early 2000s was indeed the highest among all years.    
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primary treatments together account for about one third of total treatments. To address this 
concern, in Table 8 I estimate the effects of laws on primary treatment rates per 100,000 state 
residents. Since primary treatments are mutually exclusive, the changes in rates for one drug 
will not directly affect the rates of other drugs. Columns (1) and (2) show that, although the 
estimates for marijuana rates are small and insignificant, the estimates for heroin treatment 
rates remain negative and significant (linear time trends). However, these results are probably 
biased downward by the state of Washington; as mentioned previously, the total number of 
treatments in Washington halved after 1999. Therefore, in Columns (3) and (4), I control 
separately for Washington. Since California and Colorado also appear to have negative 
effects especially on marijuana treatments, in Columns (5) and (6) I estimate the effects of 
laws further conditional on California and Colorado. As seen from Table 8, even though the 
estimated effects of laws on treatment rates are much noisier, they are quantitatively similar 
to the estimates on ratios from previous tables. Conditional on California, Colorado, or 
Washington, the estimates of Lawst continue to suggest an increase in marijuana treatments 
by about 9% and a decrease in heroin treatments by 13–23% after medical marijuana 
legalization. (But the estimates on cocaine are really sensitive to time trend specifications.) 
Therefore, the above negative relationships between marijuana and heroin are not 
mechanically driven by the measure of ratios.  
Multidrug abuse is common among cocaine and heroin treatment patients. In the 
sample, 30% of cocaine-primary treatment patients reported marijuana abuse, and 40% of 
heroin-primary treatment patients reported cocaine abuse. Moreover, the relationship is not 
symmetric: only 17% of marijuana-primary treatment patients report cocaine abuse, and 5% 
of cocaine-primary treatment patients report heroin abuse. This observable fact that patients 
who use harder drugs are more likely to use softer drugs (but not vice versa) is a major basis 
for the famous gateway hypothesis. Although the estimates in previous tables indicate that, 
on average, marijuana could be a substitute for heroin but has no direct relationship with 
cocaine, the substitution and complementarity between drugs may vary by different types of 
drug users, as some experimental studies suggest (Jofre-Bonet and Petry 2008; Petry 2001; 
Petry and Bickel 1998; Chalmers, Bradford, and Jones 2010). To investigate potential 
heterogeneous legalization effects, I focus on the two most common combinations in the 
TEDS: (1) cocaine-primary with marijuana and (2) heroin-primary with cocaine. Cocaine-
primary with marijuana treatments are the subset of cocaine-primary treatments in which 
marijuana is either a secondary or tertiary abuse problem. Heroin-primary with cocaine 
treatments are defined in the same way.  
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One potential concern about the results to this point is that they might be driven by 
treatment facilities' unobserved reactions to medical marijuana laws rather than real changes 
in underlying drug use. For instance, rehabilitation facilities might give priority to marijuana 
addicts, and therefore indirectly reduce the enrollment of heroin patients due to capacity 
constraints. Estimating the effects of laws on "speedball" treatments can partially address this 
concern, as "speedball" is probably the hardest form of abuse to treat and its treatment 
admissions are less likely to be affected by these unobservable factors. The direct injection of 
cocaine and heroin together is perhaps the strongest and most dangerous way to combine 
these drugs.  This is called "speedball" or "powerballing," and it has caused many celebrity 
deaths, including River Phoenix along with many others. I utilize the information on the 
routes of drug use to create "speedball" treatment ratios, a subset of heroin-primary with 
cocaine treatments in which heroin injection is the primary problem and cocaine injection is 
the secondary or tertiary problem. (The number of treatments for which cocaine injection is 
the primary problem and heroin injection is secondary/tertiary is very small). The summary 
statistics of these treatment ratios are presented in Appendix Table C3. The sample sizes are 
smaller due to missing data in non-primary drugs or routes of use, but fortunately most of the 
states with missing data are not medical marijuana states. 
Table 9 shows the estimated effects on treatment ratios of these drug combinations. 
All of the estimates for cocaine-primary with marijuana treatments are positive. Although the 
estimated standard errors are large, most of the magnitudes of the estimates are comparable to 
those for marijuana treatments in Table 5. The point estimates indicate roughly a 10% 
increase in treatments in which cocaine is the primary abuse problem and marijuana is the 
secondary abuse problem. It is possible that a complementary effect of marijuana on cocaine, 
or even a gateway effect, may indeed exist for this subset of cocaine users.20 One might be 
worried that the estimates for marijuana-primary or -related treatments in Table 6 are driven 
by cocaine users who also use marijuana, so the increase in marijuana is actually a byproduct 
of an increase in (a subset of) cocaine treatments. However, the results on marijuana 
treatments are nearly the same even if I exclude admissions that report any cocaine use (not 
reported in the paper). For heroin-primary treatment patients who also report cocaine abuse, 
the estimated effects of the laws are negative and often significant, with a similar magnitude 
of decrease by around 10–20% as in Table 6. Therefore, the decline in heroin treatment 
20 There is other evidence suggesting a potential complementary relationship between marijuana and cocaine. 
From the public-use NSDUH data, the estimates for marijuana decriminalization in California and 
Massachusetts are positive for both marijuana and cocaine use (not reported).   
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patients is similar regardless of whether they also use cocaine or not. In fact, the estimates are 
also quantitatively similar for treatments in which heroin is the primary drug and marijuana is 
the secondary or tertiary drug (not reported). For "speedball" treatments, the estimates 
indicate a decrease of about 10–20%. As these estimates for “speedball” treatments are 
similar to those for heroin treatments, they provide indirect evidence that the decline in 
heroin treatments is unlikely to be the result of changes in treatment facilities’ enrollment 
procedures.  
 
6. Discussion of Results and Conclusion 
In this paper, using data on drug possession arrests and treatment admissions, I 
estimate reduced-form models for the effects of medical marijuana laws on these proxies for 
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin usage. My results indicate a 10−15% increase in marijuana 
use, likely on both the intensive and extensive margins, after the passage of medical 
marijuana laws. Although it is a widely accepted belief that marijuana is a complement to 
cocaine and heroin, at least for the subpopulation studied here, I do not find strong evidence 
supporting such a relationship between marijuana and cocaine or heroin. The possession 
arrests for cocaine and heroin combined do not significantly change or even appear to 
decrease after medical marijuana legalization. From the treatment data, I find roughly a 20% 
decrease in heroin treatment admissions, but no significant change in cocaine treatment 
admissions. Although these findings are fairly unexpected, they are consistent with findings 
from Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014) that these medical marijuana laws do not 
increase cocaine and heroin use. Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2012) also find a large 
reduction in cocaine use among teenagers after medical marijuana legalization. The results 
from this study are also consistent with some qualitative studies that report medical marijuana 
patients substituting marijuana for alcohol and other illegal drugs (Reiman 2009, 2007; Harris 
et al. 2000). In fact, some anecdotal evidence suggests that marijuana can ease the craving for 
heroin.  
One obvious limitation of this study is that it relies largely on indirect measures of 
drug use. The estimates for drug arrests and treatments might be biased if police or treatment 
facilities respond endogenously to these medical marijuana laws. Also, these medical 
marijuana laws may lower people’s perception of the risks associated with marijuana, and 
potential patients may be less likely to seek treatment. For instance, some of the negative 
estimates of marijuana treatments in California and Colorado are probably biased downward 
by these unobserved factors. It might be the case that law enforcement’s or individuals’ 
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perceptions become more favorable towards cocaine and heroin as well due to these medical 
marijuana laws, and that might account for the negative estimates reported in this study.  
Another related limitation is that arrests and treatment admissions are not able to 
identify the extensive and intensive margins separately. Although this limitation does not 
change the qualitative interpretation, it makes quantitative interpretation much more difficult. 
Even if there is indeed a substitution effect between marijuana and heroin, it is unclear at 
which margins people substitute their consumption. In fact, I intentionally avoid using terms 
such as "elasticity of substitution" to interpret these reduced-form results, as these estimates 
theoretically capture effects at both margins. As heroin is one of the most addictive drugs, a 
reasonable guess would be that any potential substitution effect is largely at the intensive 
margin. Future studies will contribute to this literature by separately identifying changes in 
the extensive and intensive margins.   
Results in this study suggest that, on average, marijuana is probably a substitute for 
heroin, but it does not have a strong relationship with cocaine. However, the relationships 
between substances may be heterogeneous and depend on different types of users. For 
instance, the paper suggests a potential positive effect on patients who use cocaine with 
marijuana, but a negative effect on patients who use cocaine with heroin. To evaluate the 
impacts of medical marijuana laws, future research has to consider these potential 
heterogeneous effects carefully. Due to constraints such as sample sizes from currently 
available datasets, qualitative studies with detailed and extensive descriptions of drug use 
behaviors may be equally important as quantitative studies.  
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Table 1: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Drug Possession Arrests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Marijuana Arrest Ratios among Adult Males 
Law 0.080* 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.108** 0.162*** 0.170*** 0.173*** 0.184*** (0.047) (0.036) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.045) (0.060) (0.067) 
Obs. 12,448 12,448 12,448 10,689 12,448 10,689 905 905 
 
      
  
Cocaine and Heroin Arrest Ratios among Adult Males 
Law -0.122** -0.153*** -0.016 -0.005 0.010 0.001 -0.026 -0.082 (0.051) (0.039) (0.033) (0.034) (0.055) (0.052) (0.077) (0.127) 
Obs. 10,825 10,825 10,825 9,200 10,825 9,200 859 859 
 
        # of States 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Controls No No No Yes No Yes No No 
Model Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Linear Linear Poisson Linear 
Time 
trends No Linear Quadratic  Quadratic  Quadratic  Quadratic  
Quadratic 
(State)  
Quadratic 
(State) 
Note.― All specifications include city/state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a dummy 
variable for decriminalization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are 
clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Table 2: Effects on Drug Possession Arrests among Blacks and Whites   
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Marijuana Arrest Ratios Among Blacks 
 
Marijuana Arrest Ratios Among Whites 
Law 0.138*** 0.057 0.154**  
0.073* 0.100*** 0.174** 
(0.053) (0.046) (0.063) (0.044) (0.035) (0.071) 
Obs. 12,404 12,404 905  12,439 12,439 905 
 
  
  
 
  
 
Cocaine and Heroin Arrest Ratios 
Among Blacks 
 
Cocaine and Heroin Arrest Ratios 
Among Whites 
Law -0.130*** -0.024 -0.093  
-0.187*** -0.017 0.029 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.110) (0.046) (0.034) (0.086) 
Obs. 10,801 10,801 859  10,823 10,823 859 
 
  
  
  
 
Time Trends Linear  Quadratic Quadratic (State)  Linear  Quadratic 
Quadratic 
(State) 
    Note.― The estimates are from a Poisson model. All specifications include city/state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and a dummy variable for decriminalization. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects on Drug Possession Arrests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Marijuana Arrest Ratios  
 
Cocaine and Heroin Arrest Ratios 
Law 0.077*** 0.089*** 0.121** 0.095  
-0.169*** -0.008 -0.078 -0.072 
(0.027) (0.033) (0.059) (0.062) (0.034) (0.038) (0.049) (0.073) 
Dispensary 
× Law 
0.141* 0.082 
 
0.076 
 
0.151 -0.065 
 
-0.015 
(0.072) (0.076) (0.093) (0.096) (0.075) (0.108) 
CA × Law   
-0.041 -0.014 
   
0.082 0.076 
  
(0.066) (0.073) (0.060) (0.080) 
CO × Law   
-0.028 -0.002 
   
0.377*** 0.371*** 
  
(0.060) (0.062) (0.071) (0.086) 
Obs. 12,448 12,448 12,448 12,448  10,825 10,825 10,825 10,825 
Time 
trends Linear Quadratic  Quadratic  Quadratic   Linear Quadratic  Quadratic  Quadratic  
    Note.― The estimates are from a Poisson model. All specifications include city fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and a dummy variable for decriminalization. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4: Dynamic Responses of Cocaine and Heroin Arrests to Medical Marijuana Laws 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years       
  
0.029 0.068*** 
 
-0.026 
(neg. 1 - 2) (0.020) (0.014) (0.047) 
Year of  law 
change  
-0.128 -0.026 -0.077 0.162* 0.039 0.007 
(0.110) (0.066) (0.127) (0.093) (0.097) (0.128) 
Years  -0.129** -0.077** -0.109* -0.006 -0.065 -0.089 
1 - 2 (0.052) (0.038) (0.060) (0.034) (0.074) (0.090) 
Years  -0.174*** -0.109** -0.150*** -0.023 -0.109 -0.138 
3 - 4 (0.047) (0.046) (0.057) (0.046) (0.078) (0.097) 
Years  -0.238*** -0.200*** -0.209** -0.104 -0.234** -0.267** 
5 - 6 (0.074) (0.065) (0.084) (0.065) (0.095) (0.111) 
Years  -0.267*** -0.283*** -0.235** -0.181*** -0.184 -0.221* 
7 - 8 (0.096) (0.059) (0.110) (0.058) (0.126) (0.118) 
Years  -0.353*** -0.452*** -0.315** -0.346*** -0.375*** -0.415*** 
9 - 10 (0.114) (0.059) (0.131) (0.056) (0.145) (0.131) 
Years  -0.216 -0.484*** -0.170 -0.377*** -0.360* -0.402** 
11+ (0.147) (0.062) (0.168) (0.058) (0.207) (0.194) 
     
  Obs. 10,825 10,825 10,825 10,825 859 859 
# of States 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Time Trends Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic  Quadratic (State)  
Quadratic 
(State) 
     Note.― The estimates are from a Poisson model. All specifications include city/state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and a dummy variable for decriminalization. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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Table 5: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Treatment Ratios (All Referrals) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
 
Marijuana-related Treatment 
 
 Marijuana-primary Treatment 
Law 0.059* 0.059* 0.072* 0.078 
 
0.095 0.086* 0.100* 0.098 
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.038) (0.067) (0.064) (0.051) (0.056) (0.085) 
          
 
Cocaine-related Treatment 
 
Cocaine-primary Treatment 
Law 0.019 -0.011 0.009 -0.003 
 
0.047 0.023 0.055 -0.008 
 (0.058) (0.075) (0.072) (0.069) (0.071) (0.103) (0.098) (0.075) 
    
 
Heroin-related Treatment 
 
Heroin-primary Treatment 
Law -0.202*** -0.102* -0.091 -0.158* 
 
-0.239*** -0.131** -0.129** -0.227** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.059) (0.082) (0.060) (0.064) (0.060) (0.091) 
          
Obs. 972 972 871 972  972 972 871 972 
Controls No No Yes No  No No Yes No 
Model Poisson Poisson Poisson Linear  Poisson Poisson Poisson Linear Time 
Trends Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic  Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic  
    Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects and a dummy variable for 
decriminalization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The sample sizes are only 958 or 859 for heroin treatments 
because data is missing for Nebraska for the years 2004–2006 and Tennessee for the years 1998–2008.  
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Table 6: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Treatment Ratios (Non-criminal Justice Referrals) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
 
Marijuana-related Treatment 
 
 Marijuana-primary Treatment 
Law 0.086** 0.074** 0.086** 0.067 0.106* 0.060 0.058 0.045 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.054)  (0.060) (0.052) (0.055) (0.070) 
          
 
Cocaine-related Treatment 
 
Cocaine-primary Treatment 
Law 0.006 -0.020 0.001 -0.023 0.014 -0.004 0.032 -0.007 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.058) (0.063)  (0.068) (0.085) (0.072) (0.069) 
    
 
Heroin-related Treatment 
 
Heroin-primary Treatment 
Law -0.192*** -0.131** -0.117** -0.155* -0.223*** -0.160*** -0.153*** -0.217*** 
 (0.058) (0.052) (0.048) (0.083)  (0.053) (0.054) (0.049) (0.078) 
          
Obs. 965 965 867 965  965 965 867 965 
Controls No No Yes No  No No Yes No 
Model Poisson Poisson Poisson Linear  Poisson Poisson Poisson Linear Time 
Trends Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic  Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic      Note.― All specifications include state and year fixed effects and a dummy variable for 
decriminalization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample sizes are only 951 or 855 for heroin treatments 
because data is missing for Nebraska for the years 2004–2006 and Tennessee for the years 1998–2008. 
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Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects on Primary Treatment Ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
  
 Marijuana-primary Treatment 
Law 0.072 0.084* 0.120* 0.115** 0.097* 0.114***  (0.054) (0.044) (0.066) (0.051) (0.054) (0.041)  
Dispensary 
× Law 
0.137 0.023   0.126 0.012  
(0.127) (0.126)   (0.125) (0.123)  
CA × Law   
-0.195*** -0.272*** -0.174*** -0.270***  
(0.075) (0.074) (0.066) (0.065)  
CO × Law   
-0.512*** -0.466*** -0.495*** -0.465***  
(0.059) (0.043) (0.053) (0.038)  
        
 
Cocaine-primary Treatment 
Law 0.007 0.004 0.040 0.010 -0.009 -0.013  (0.059) (0.082) (0.084) (0.117) (0.070) (0.091)  
Dispensary 
× Law 
0.219* 0.192   0.228* 0.200  
(0.130) (0.280)   (0.133) (0.283)  
CA × Law   
0.124 0.258** 0.170* 0.285***  
(0.107) (0.126) (0.091) (0.096)  
CO × Law   
-0.181** -0.114 -0.141* -0.098  
(0.087) (0.114) (0.077) (0.097)  
        
 
Heroin-primary Treatment 
Law -0.213*** -0.159** -0.222*** -0.164** -0.185* -0.204***  (0.075) (0.066) (0.077) (0.070) (0.096) (0.073)  
Dispensary 
× Law 
-0.111 0.166 
  
-0.125 0.191*  
(0.125) (0.105)  (0.128) (0.108)  
CA × Law   
-0.071 0.233*** -0.104 0.278***  
(0.094) (0.084) (0.106) (0.094)  
CO × Law   
-0.114 -0.108 -0.141 -0.082  
(0.112) (0.101) (0.120) (0.092)  
    
  
  
Time Trends Linear Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic   
    Note.― The estimates are from a Poisson model. All specifications include state 
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a dummy variable for decriminalization. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Drug Treatment Rates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
  
 Marijuana-primary Treatment 
Law 0.041 0.046 0.056 0.057 0.086 0.089  (0.083) (0.084) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089) (0.093)  
WA × Law   -0.264** -0.220** -0.297*** -0.252**    (0.106) (0.105) (0.110) (0.111)  
CA × Law     -0.066 -0.383***  
    (0.116) (0.135)  
CO × Law     -0.435*** -0.280***  
    (0.089) (0.082)  
        
 
Cocaine-primary Treatment 
Law -0.048 0.053 -0.023 0.085 -0.034 0.090  (0.084) (0.205) (0.088) (0.220) (0.108) (0.261)  
WA × Law 
  -0.408*** -0.462* -0.400** -0.467  
  (0.148) (0.251) (0.168) (0.291)  
CA × Law     0.267* -0.006  
    (0.159) (0.305)  
CO × Law     -0.041 -0.040      (0.128) (0.236)  
        
 
Heroin-primary Treatment 
Law -0.288*** -0.163 -0.258** -0.133 -0.227* -0.129  (0.100) (0.114) (0.102) (0.122) (0.122) (0.146)  
WA × Law   -0.575*** -0.508*** -0.619*** -0.512***    (0.118) (0.151) (0.141) (0.176)  
CA × Law     -0.132 -0.049  
    (0.124) (0.167)  
CO × Law     -0.038 0.047  
    (0.163) (0.169)  
        
Time Trends Linear Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic  Linear Quadratic      Note.― The estimates are from a Poisson model. All specifications include state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and a dummy variable for decriminalization. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Multidrug Treatment 
Ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 
Cocaine Primary w/ Marijuana 
Law 0.109 0.086 0.064 0.108 (0.089) (0.109) (0.093) (0.106) 
     
 Heroin Primary w/ Cocaine 
Law -0.127** -0.182** -0.250* -0.188* (0.057) (0.079) (0.125) (0.109) 
  
 "Speedball" 
Law -0.080 -0.205** -0.257* -0.229* (0.096) (0.092) (0.144) (0.132) 
 
    
Model Poisson Poisson Log-Linear Log-Linear 
Time 
Trends Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic  
Note.― All specifications include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
and a dummy variable for decriminalization. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the state level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1: Arrests and Prices of Marijuana and Cocaine, 1992–2011 (Normalized) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Marijuana Arrest Ratios Before and After the Passage of Laws at the City Level 
(upper) and the State Level (lower) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Cocaine and Heroin Arrest Ratios Before and After the Passage of Laws at the City 
Level (upper) and the State Level (lower) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4: Treatment Ratios Before and After the Passage of Laws 
Appendix A: State Medical Marijuana Laws as of July 20141 
Appendix Table A1: Medical Marijuana Laws 
State Date Passed/ Date Effective Margin of Approval Registration Dispensary 
Possession 
Limit 
Alaska Nov. 3, 1998 /Mar. 4, 1999 
58% 
(Ballot Measure 8) Yes No 
1 oz/6 plants 
(3 mature,  
3 immature) 
Arizona Nov. 2, 2010 50.13% (Proposition 203) Yes Yes 
2.5 oz/12 
plants 
California Nov. 5, 1996 /Nov. 6, 1996 
56% 
(Proposition 215) 
Yes 
(Voluntary 
since Jan. 1, 
2004) 
Yes* 
8 oz/ 
6 mature or  
12 immature  
Colorado Nov. 7, 2000 /Jun. 1, 2001 
54% 
(Ballot Amendment 
20) 
Yes Yes* 
2 oz/6plants 
(3 mature,  
3 immature) 
Connecticut May 31, 2012 
96-51 House;  
21–13 Senate 
(House Bill 5389) 
Yes Yes One-month supply 
D.C May 21, 2010 /Jul. 27, 2010 
13–0 vote 
(Amendment Act B18-
622) 
Yes Yes 2 oz  
Delaware  May 13, 2011 /Jul. 1, 2011 
27-14 House;  
17-4 Senate 
(Senate Bill 17) 
Yes Yes 6 oz 
Hawaii Jun. 14, 2000 /Dec. 28, 2000 
32-18 House;  
13-12 Senate 
(Senate Bill 862) 
Yes No 
3 oz/7 plants  
(3 mature,  
4 immature) 
Illinois Aug. 1, 2013/ Jan. 1, 2014 
61-57 House;  
35-21 Senate  
(House Bill 1) 
Yes Yes 2.5oz 
Maine Nov. 2, 1999 /Dec. 22, 1999 
61% 
(Ballot Question 2) 
Yes 
(Mandatory 
after Dec. 31, 
2010) 
Yes (2009 
Amendment) 2.5 oz/6 plants 
Maryland Apr. 8, 2014/ Jun. 1, 2014 
125-11 House;  
44-2 Senate  
(House Bill 881) 
Yes Yes 30-day supply 
Massachusetts Nov. 6,2012 /Jan. 1, 2013 
63% 
(Ballot Question 3) Yes Yes 60-day supply 
1 For legal documents and details, see “23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.” on the ProCon.org website: 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (accessed 07.07.2014). 
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Michigan Nov. 4, 2008 /Dec. 4, 2008 
63% 
(Proposal 1) Yes No 
2.5 oz/12 
plants 
Minnesota May 30, 2014 
 89-40 House;  
46-16 Senate  
(Senate Bill 2470) 
Yes Yes 30-day supply 
Montana Nov. 2, 2004 62% (Initiative 148) Yes No 
1 oz/4 plants 
(mature) 
Nevada Nov. 7, 2000 /Oct. 1, 2001 
65% 
(Ballot Question 9) Yes No 
1 oz/7 plants  
(3 mature,  
4 immature) 
New Hampshire Jul. 23, 2013 
284-66 House;  
18-6 Senate 
(House Bill 5732) 
Yes Yes 2oz 
New Jersey Jan. 18, 2010 
48-14 House;  
25-13 Senate 
(Senate Bill 119) 
Yes Yes 2 oz 
New Mexico Mar. 13, 2007 /Jul. 1, 2007 
36-31 House;  
32-3 Senate 
(Senate Bill 523) 
Yes Yes 
6 oz/16 plants 
(4 mature,  
12 immature) 
New York Jul. 5, 2014 
 117-13 Assembly;  
49-10 Senate  
(Assembly Bill 6357) 
Yes Yes 30-day supply 
Oregon Nov. 3, 1998 /Dec. 3, 1998 
55% 
(Ballot Measure 67) Yes No 
24 oz/24 plants 
(6 mature,  
18 immature) 
Rhode Island Jan. 3, 2006 
52-10 House;  
33-1 Senate 
(Senate Bill 0710) 
Yes Yes (2009 Amendment) 
2.5 oz/12 
plants 
Vermont May 26, 2004 /Jul. 1, 2004 
82-59 House;  
22-7 Senate 
(Senate Bill 76) 
Yes Yes (2011 Amendment) 
2 oz/9 plants 
(2 mature, 
7 immature) 
Washington Nov. 3, 1998 59% (Initiative 692) No No 24 oz/15 plants 
* These laws only recognize the existence of dispensaries and are silent on their legality.   
+ The initiative (Proposition 203) did not set an effective date but required the creation of a medical 
marijuana program within 120 days. From the Arizona Department of Health Services website, 
qualifying patients began applying for identification cards on April 14, 2011. I take that as the 
effective date. 
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Appendix B Results from the Public-Use NSDUH Data 
1. Public-Use NSDUH Data 
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) 
provides state-level estimates of illicit drug use from the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH) for the years 2002 to 2011/2012. The NSDUH is a national representative 
sample and is the largest government survey of its kind. The state-level data are only 
available starting in 2002 and they are reported as two-year moving averages.1 Specifically, 
the SAMHSA estimates a logistic model using two years of data together with a list of 
predictors such as racial composition, arrests for drugs and other crimes, treatment rates, local 
economic indicators, etc. The predicted values from the model are reported as the state-level 
measures of drug usage (Wright 2004). For instance, the drug use rates in the 2011 report are 
predicted probabilities using both the 2010 and 2011 data, and the drug use rates in the 2012 
report are predicted from both the 2011 and 2012 data, and so forth. The data oversample 
younger populations. The state-level estimates are available separately for three age groups 
that are equally sampled: ages 12–17, 18–25, and 26 and above.2 The state-level estimates of 
drug use are available for marijuana use in the past month, marijuana initiation rate, cocaine 
use in the past year, etc. Use in the past month is commonly defined as current usage in the 
literature, and it is the measure reported in the previous studies based on the NSDUH such as 
Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012), Wall et al. (2011), and Wen, Hockenberry, and 
Cummings (2014). However, out of a concern for precision, in the public-use NSDUH, the 
SAMHSA only provides state-level estimates for past-year cocaine use and does not report 
state-level estimates for heroin use.3 In the next section, I focus on marijuana use in the past 
month, marijuana initiation (average annual rates), and cocaine use in the past year. The 
descriptive statistics are in Table B1. Figure B1 shows the yearly averages for marijuana and 
cocaine use rates for ages 12 and above across all states. Interestingly, at the national level, 
coinciding with the increasing popularity of medical marijuana laws, marijuana use has 
increased since 2008, while at the same time, cocaine use has actually decreased since 2008.   
 
1 For the first year available, 2002, the state-level estimates are based only on that year rather than on two years. 
The state level estimates are also available for 1999–2001; however, the SAMHSA changed the survey 
procedure in 2002 and the response rates and substance prevalence rates were significantly higher than in 
previous years. Therefore, these data from 1999–2001 are not comparable with later years. 
2 Except for eight large states, the number of observations in each year is 900 (in the other 42 states and D.C.). 
The sample sizes of 900 are equally distributed among the three age groups, 12–17, 18–25, and 26 and above, 
and therefore each age group has a sample size of 300. 
3 Probably due to high addictiveness, the past-month cocaine or heroin use rates are actually very close to the 
past-year use rates in the NSDUH data.   
                                                             
2. Results 
To identify the effect of medical marijuana laws on drug use, I estimate the following 
linear model by OLS: 
 
(1) Yst = β Lawst + State fixed effectss + Year fixed effectst + Control variables + εist , 
 
where Yst is marijuana use rates in the past month, marijuana initiation annual rates, or 
cocaine use rates in the past year. I focus on a linear model and the level specification in 
order to be directly comparable with the previous studies such as Harper, Strumpf, and 
Kaufman (2012) and Wall et al. (2011). Lawst is a dummy variable indicating whether a state 
s had a medical marijuana law during year t, and it takes on fractional values for the years in 
which laws changed. As the dependent variables are already predicted values, as in the paper, 
I only include marijuana decriminalization in California (effective on January 1, 2011) and 
Massachusetts (effective on January 2, 2009) as a control variable. The results in this section 
are nearly identical with the inclusion of the same set of control variables in the paper (not 
reported).  
Table B2 shows the estimates of β from Equation (1). For states with law changes in 
the sample period, the years 2002–2012, their average drug use rates before the law changes 
are also reported in Table B2. The results for marijuana use are in the upper panel. For the 
specification with only state fixed effects [Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)], the estimates 
suggest strong positive effects of medical marijuana laws on marijuana use in the past month. 
For people aged 12 and above, medical marijuana laws, on average, result in a 0.76 
percentage point increase in past-month marijuana use, which is equivalent to around a 
10.8% increase. Similarly, the estimates imply an increase in marijuana use of around 0.54 
percentage points (6.5%) for juveniles aged 12-17, of 0.96 percentage points (4.9%) for 
adults aged 18–25, and of 0.70 percentage points (15.2%) for adults aged 26 and above. On 
the other hand, in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), the estimates from the specification with 
state-specific linear time trends are essentially zero. I also check the robustness of estimates 
based on an alternative coding of the first years of Lawst that accounts for the dependent 
variables being two-year moving averages. For example, Michigan passed a medical 
marijuana law in November 2008, and Lawst takes two over 24 (instead of two over 12) in 
2007/2008 data and it takes 22/24 in 2008/2009 data. The results remain similar. The point 
estimates are somewhat larger but also with greater estimated standard errors.  
The results for marijuana initiation are presented in the middle panel. For the 
specification with only state fixed effects [Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)], the estimates 
suggest strong positive effects of medical marijuana laws on marijuana initiation. As 
expected, the estimates indicate larger effects on ages 12–17 and ages 18–25 but no effects on 
ages 26 and above. Specifically, the estimates imply an increase in the annual rate of first-
time use of marijuana of around 0.47 percentage points (6.7%) for juveniles aged 12-17 and 
of 0.84 percentage points (10.7%) for adults aged 18–25. The estimates are nearly identical 
under the alternative coding of the first years of the laws. Similar to the results in the upper 
panel, in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), the estimates from the specification with state-
specific linear time trends are never significant. The results for marijuana from the upper and 
middle panel are very close to those from the restricted version of the NSDUH in Wen, 
Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014).4 Since those researchers do include state-specific time 
trends in their models, the small and insignificant estimates from specifications with time 
trends are most likely due to the fact that the public-use NSDUH data only report drug use as 
two-year moving averages. 
 For cocaine use in the past year in the lower panel, all of the estimates are 
insignificant with very large estimated standard errors except for one instance [Column (6)]. 
Because of the relatively low prevalence rates for cocaine, the sample sizes in each state seem 
to be not large enough to produce precise state-level estimates for cocaine use, and it is 
difficult to evaluate the policy effect of these laws based on these estimates. In fact, the 
estimates from Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014) based on individual-level data are 
actually similar to the results here, and there is no significant increase in precision. For 
example, they report an estimate of 0.19 percentage points (with estimated standard errors of 
0.15) on past-month cocaine use for people aged 21 and above. That is quite similar to the 
estimates on past-year cocaine use in Column (1).   
In summary, the estimates from the public-use NSDUH indicate a strong positive 
effect of medical marijuana laws on marijuana use and initiation, but no significant effect on 
cocaine use.  
 
 
 
 
4 Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2014) only look at ages 12–20 and ages 20 and above. For ages 12–20, 
they only find positive effects of the laws on marijuana initiation but not on marijuana use in the past month. 
                                                             
  
Appendix Table B1: NSDUH Descriptive Statistics 2002-2011/2012 
 
Marijuana Use in the Past Month (%) 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
Age 12+ 6.56  
8.12 
 
5.78 
(1.77) (1.84) (1.10) 
Age12-17 7.6  
8.85 
 
6.97 
(1.67) (1.59) (1.33) 
Age 18-25 17.88  
21.25 
 
16.19 
(4.61) (4.41) (3.69) 
Age 26+ 4.46  
5.77 
 
3.81 
(1.47) (1.59) (0.83) 
      
 
Marijuana Initiation Annual Rate (%) 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
Age 12+ 1.84 2.10 1.71 (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.26) 
Age12-17 6.19  6.99  5.79 (1.15)  (1.07)  (0.97) 
Age 18-25 7.23  8.20  6.75 (1.58)  (1.60)  (1.33) 
Age 26+ 0.15  0.18  0.14 (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.04) 
      
 
Cocaine Use in the Past Year (%) 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
Age 12+ 2.17  
2.49 
 
2.01 
(0.60) (0.64) (0.50) 
Age12-17 1.42  
1.51 
 
1.38 
(0.53) (0.58) (0.50) 
Age 18-25 6.13  
7.04 
 
5.68 
(1.77) (1.71) (1.62) 
Age 26+ 1.58  
1.83 
 
1.45 
(0.54) (0.67) (0.41) 
      Obs. 561   187   374 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Table B2: Effects of Medical Marijuana Laws on Drug Use 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
 
Marijuana Use in the Past Month 
 
Age 12+  Age 12-17 
 
Age 18-25 
 
Age 26+ 
Pre-law mean 7.04%  8.28% 
 
19.75% 
 
4.63% 
   
 
      
  
Law 0.757*** -0.01  0.541* -0.052  
0.960** 0.339 
 
0.702*** -0.047 
(0.180) (0.325)  (0.308) (0.517) (0.438) (0.615) (0.183) (0.310) 
            
Law  
(alternative) 
0.894*** 0.063  0.515* -0.145 
 
1.243** 0.669 
 
0.835*** -0.005 
(0.214) (0.311)  (0.270) (0.534) (0.525) (0.789) (0.219) (0.288) 
 
           
 
Marijuana Initiation Annual Rate 
 
Age 12+  Age 12-17 
 
Age 18-25 
 
Age 26+ 
Pre-law mean 1.97%  6.93% 7.83% 0.16% 
   
 
      
  
Law 0.222** 0.069  0.474** -0.095  0.841*** 0.603  0.016 0.039 (0.084) (0.091)  (0.209) (0.401)  (0.297) (0.464)  (0.016) (0.030) 
            
Law  
(alternative) 
0.235** 0.091  0.492** -0.178  0.872*** 0.803  0.020 0.056 
(0.089) (0.116)  (0.225) (0.479)  (0.310) (0.597)  (0.017) (0.045) 
 
           
 
Cocaine Use in the Past Year 
 
Age 12+ 
 
Age 12-17 
 
Age 18-25 
 
Age 26+ 
Pre-law mean 2.77% 
 
1.65% 
 
7.14% 
 
2.14% 
          
  
Law 0.110 0.127  
-0.054 -0.111 
 
0.230 0.435 
 
0.099 0.105 
(0.097) (0.199) (0.119) (0.138) (0.319) (0.284) (0.129) (0.235) 
            
Law  
(alternative) 
0.140 0.206 
 
-0.068 -0.129 
 
0.241 0.677** 
 
0.137 0.163 
(0.092) (0.221) (0.118) (0.151) (0.311) (0.292) (0.129) (0.266) 
 
           
Obs. 561 561  561 561  561 561  561 561 State linear time 
trends No Yes   No Yes   No Yes   No Yes 
     Note.― All specifications include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a dummy 
variable for decriminalization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and they 
are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix Figure B1: Marijuana Use (in the past month) and Cocaine Use (in the past year) 
for Ages 12+ from the NSDUH data 
 
 
Appendix C  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Appendix Table C1: UCR Descriptive Statistics 1992-2011 
 
Marijuana Possession Arrest Ratios 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
 Adult Males 3.79  
3.12 
 
4.36  
(2.56) (2.48) (2.49) 
 Adult Blacks 3.61  
2.99 
 
4.14 
(2.95) (2.84) ( 2.94) 
 Adult Whites 3.34  
2.77  
 
3.82 
(2.32) (2.25) (2.26) 
      
Obs. 12,448 
 
5,725 
 
6,723 
      
 
Cocaine and Heroin Possession Arrest Ratios 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
 Adult Males 3.03  
3.54 
 
2.51 
(2.42) (2.61) (2.09) 
Adult Blacks 3.19  
3.29 
 
3.10 
(2.74) (2.91) (2.55) 
 Adult Whites 2.92  
3.73 
 
2.09 
(2.63) (2.85) (2.09) 
      
Obs. 10,825 
 
5,464 
 
5,361 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table C2: TEDS Descriptive Statistics 1992-2011 
 
Related Treatment Ratios (%) 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
Marijuana 33.59  
31.3 
 
34.72 
(9.37) (9.67) (9.01) 
Cocaine 27.42  
24.25 
 
29.00 
(13.33) (12.92) (13.26) 
 Heroin 11.59  
15.97 
 
9.37 
(12.85) (13.55) (11.88) 
      
 
Primary Treatment Ratios (%) 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
Marijuana 10.97  
9.03 
 
11.93 
(4.88) (3.96) (5.01) 
Cocaine 13.01  
9.53 
 
14.73 
(8.79) (7.02) (9.06) 
 Heroin 9.43  
13.34 
 
7.45 
(11.49) (12.63) (10.32) 
      
Obs. 972 
 
322 
 
650 
The sample size is only 958 in heroin treatments because data 
are missing for Nebraska for years 2004–2006 and for 
Tennessee for years 1998–2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table C3: TEDS Descriptive Statistics 1992-2011 
 
Treatment Ratios (%) 
 
All States 
 
MJ States 
 
Non-MJ States 
Cocaine Primary w/ 
Marijuana 
4.22 
 
3.00 
 
4.82 
(2.97) (2.03) (3.18) 
Obs. 971 
 
321 
 
650 
    
Heroin Primary w/ 
Cocaine 
3.55 
 
4.76 
 
2.93 
(4.67) (5.14) (4.29) 
Obs. 952 
 
321 
 
631 
      
Speedball 1.29  
1.76 
 
1.04 
(1.77) (1.95) (1.61) 
Obs. 925   318   607 
 
 
